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The Higher Education Act is now up for reauthorization.
Professor of Law at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law. This essay benefitted greatly from discussions with Professor
Michael Simkovic, recent law graduates and academics at the Education Fi-
nance Research Group meeting at the State University of New York at Buffalo
in 2015, and my colleagues during a summer workshop at the University of
Maryland in 2015. I also thank C.J. Pipins and Michael Tennison for excellent
research support.
2 See Reauthorizing the Higher Education Act: Exploring Barriers and
Opportunities within Innovation: Hearing before the S. Comm. On Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, 114th Cong. (July 22, 2015),
http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/reauthorizing-the-higher-education-act-
exploring-barriers-and-opportunities-within-innovation.
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The Act provides support for both college and graduate students,
and institutions themselves. Meanwhile, the Department of Edu-
cation (DOE) is crafting rules to implement a "Revised Pay as
You Earn" (REPAYE) program to help borrowers not eligible for
other income-based repayment programs.3 As each program is
crafted, policymakers need to carefully consider the balance be-
tween mission and margin in the largely non-profit higher educa-
tion sector.4 Mission includes the research, teaching, and service
missions of the university. Margin refers to the stable financial
base of support needed to maintain the quality and continuity of
independent, civil society institutions.
Without some margin, higher education institutions can-
not fulfill their mission. But without clear evidence that higher
education institutions are actually serving the full scope of their
missions, any margin is unjustified. This complex imperative-to
assure the integrity of educational mission while avoiding exces-
sive costs-is at the core of higher education policy. There are al-
so macroeconomic factors that make education policy decisions
particularly consequential now. As reauthorization approaches,
and REPAYE rules are drafted, Congress and the DOE should
keep in mind four core principles that are often obscured in cur-
rent policy debates.
First, higher education policy must help ameliorate the ef-
fects of an era of economic inequality.' Corporations have already
For background on income contingent repayment, see John R. Brooks,
Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher Education,
104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming, 2015).
4 For background on the mission/margin balance in non-profits, see
Thomas L. Greeley & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in
the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
1 (2005). This article focuses on nonprofit institutions of higher education. For-
profit institutions pose different policy questions, and given their track record,
should be much more tightly scrutinized than nonprofits. See, e.g., TRESSIE
MCMILLAN COTTOM, LOWER ED: How FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES DEEPEN
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2016); John Quiggin, Thinking the Unthinkable,
JOHNQUIGGIN.COM, http://johnquiggin.com/2015/10/16/thinking-the-
unthinkable/ ("There is now overwhelming evidence that for-profit education
has been a disastrous failure wherever it has been tried, and particularly where
for-profit firms can gain access to public funds through policies designed to
enhance 'consumer choice."').
I For documentation of inequality, see ANTHONY ATKINSON,
INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE (2015); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN
Vol. 28:1
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shifted many risks to individuals by, for example, switching from
defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans.6 Though
most college and graduate school graduates can pay their debts,
in a higher education system as open to innovation and experi-
mentation as the United States's, there will always be some indi-
viduals for whom higher education does not pay off. For them,
income-based repayment programs (IBR) are a crucial safety net.
These programs should be strengthened by new legislation and
rules.
Second, states have dramatically cut back their support
for higher education.7 A combination of tax cutting and expand-
ing spending on prison populations and law enforcement has left
public colleges and universities struggling to maintain programs
and keep up with private institutions. Federal funding-whether
for direct scholarship programs, or indirectly in the form of feder-
al credit programs-must fill the gap left by the states, lest mil-
lions of individuals suffer economic exclusion.
Third, institutions of higher education have broad and di-
verse goals and purposes, often inextricably intertwined, which
funders need to respect and support. Unfortunately, a permanent
austerity mindset among some members of Congress (and high
level DOE officials) has created interest in cheap, technology-
driven quick fixes to improve access to higher education. These
range from online courses, to loosened accreditation standards, to
the reconfiguration of universities as mere certifiers validating the
acquisition of skills and learning elsewhere.8 While commendable
THE 2 1 sT CENTURY (2014).
6 On this and similar risk-shifting, see JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK
SHIFT (2007); Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk,
103 CALIF. L. REV. 1561 (2015).
7 Michael Mitchell, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, June 3, 2015, at
http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mitchellll.pdf (documenting dra-
matic cuts in state funding on higher education from 2007 to 2015, and com-
mensurate increases in tuition costs).
I For a critique of bare certifier and other unbundled models, see Frank
Pasquale, Private Certifiers and Deputies in American Health Care, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 1161 (2014) (in health care sector); Frank Pasquale, Synergy and Tradi-
tion: The Unity of Research, Service, and Teaching in Legal Education, 40 J.
L. PROFESSION 1 (2015). For more on the problems of unaccredited schools in
the law school context, see Michael Simkovic, What Deregulated Law Schools
Really Look Like, BRIAN LEITER'S LAW SCHOOL REP. (July 31, 2015),
2015
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as pilot programs, low-cost options should not be permitted to
prompt a predictable "race to the bottom" in educational quality.
As Australia learned when it made vocational education "con-
testable" (i.e., gave support to students in a variety of untested or
barely validated options), there are numerous entities capable of
cutting corners or even offering an entirely valueless "education"
to students.' Diploma mills, when left unchecked, can be enor-
mously tempting profit centers for private capital. The recent
findings of the Senate HELP Committee on for-profit higher edu-
cation in general should offer ample cautionary tales regarding
sudden "disruption" of traditional institutions. °
Fourth, higher education creates enormous value for both
students and society as a whole. Policymakers driven by a "return
on investment" (ROI) framework for federal spending and credit
programs should recognize the significant and lasting earnings
premiums and human capital acquisition generated by higher ed-
ucation.11 Education policy should also recognize the intangible,
http://eiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2015/07/what-deregulated-law-
schools-really-look-like-michael-simkovic.html.
' John Ross, Senate demands contestability review, THE AUSTRALIAN
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/senate-
demands-contestability-review/story-e6frgcjx-1227217379191 ("[P]rivate edu-
cation companies had made hundreds of millions of dollars in profits from
public subsidies at the same time public funding for technical and further edu-
cation was being slashed."); Leesa Wheelahan, Victorian TAFE chaos: a lesson
in how not to reform vocational education, THE CONVERSATION (May 30,
2012), https://theconversation.com/victorian-tafe-chaos-a-lesson-in-how-not-
to-reform-vocational-education-7296.
10 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS,
112TH CONG., FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO
SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 37
(Comm. Print 2012). The recent collapse of Corinthians, a for-profit chain,
shows how devastating this business model can be for students taken in by it.
1, Memorandum on Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers
Manage Their Debt, Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (June 9, 2014) ("College remains
a good investment, resulting in higher earnings and a lower risk of unemploy-
ment.") (hereinafter Memorandum); Frank McIntyre & Michael Simkovic, The
Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2014); David Leon-
hardt, Is College Worth It? Clearly, New Data Say, N.Y. TIMES (May 27,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/upshot/is-college-worth-it-clearly-
new-data-say.html?abt=0002&abg=0&_r=0; David Leonhardt, Even for Cash-
iers, College Pays Off, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/sunday-review/26leonhardt.html; Michael
Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2015),
Vol. 28:1
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hard-to-monetize, and long-term benefits generated by colleges
and universities. However, even in the very narrow framework of
ROI for better-skilled labor, extant federal investment in higher
education is well worth it and ought to be increased.
These four principles guide this essay's commentary on
two current policy debates in U.S. higher education financing.
Part I addresses the DOE's proposed regulations to implement
REPAYE for income-driven repayment of federal student loans. 2
Part II broadens the focus, making the case for lower interest
rates on student loans and more generous debt forgiveness pro-
grams in the upcoming reauthorization of the Higher Education
Act. The essay concludes with reflections on the macroeconomic
value of higher education.
I. EXTENDING INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT IN THE
REVISED PAY As You EARN PLAN
Federal student loan programs impose unique burdens
and obligations on borrowers. 3 Such loans are very rarely dis-
charged in bankruptcy proceedings. 4 However, since 1993, Con-
gress has required the DOE to provide a repayment program that
caps payments at a certain percentage of income, and forgives the
debt after a certain term of years (Income-Contingent Repay-
ment, or ICR).5 Given the unfavorable terms set by DOE at the
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2551567; Michael Sim-
kovic, Do Increases in the Cost of College Pay for Themselves?, BRIAN
LEITER'S LAW SCHOOL REP. (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2015/08/do-increases-in-the-cost-of-
college-pay-for-themselves.htmL
12 Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan
Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg.
39608 (proposed July 9, 2015) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts 668, 662, & 685).
13 Michael Konczal, Sweet Forgiveness, BOS. REV. (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/sweet-forgiveness.
14 Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges
and the Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L. J. 495 (2012) (noting
that hardship exemptions were very rarely asked for, but were granted more
often than many estimate); Tara Siegel Bernard, Judges Rebuke Limits on
Wiping Out Student Loan Debt, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/18/your-money/student-loans/judges-rebuke-
limits-on-wiping-out-student-loan-debt.html?_r=0.
5 Am. Bar Ass'n, Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates, Aug.
11-12, 2014,
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time, the program was not widely used.16 However, it did provide
some relief for borrowers caught between the Scylla of nondis-
chargeability and the Charybdis of mounting debt.
By 2007, Congress was ready to improve on the ICR pro-
gram. It mandated a new program, commonly deemed IBR (In-
come-Based Repayment). Borrowers who are enrolled in IBR pay
15% of discretionary income each year. 17 A person or family's
discretionary income is their adjusted gross income (AGI) minus
150% of the poverty level for that person or family. For example,
if a person's AGI was $30,000 in 2015 and the poverty level was
$10,000, discretionary income would be $30,000 minus $15,000
(150% of $10,000) or $15,000. Accordingly, the yearly loan re-
payment would be capped at $2,250 (15% of $15,000). Moreover,
all borrowers in this program would see the remainder of their
debt forgiven after 25 years,8 while those in public service jobs
(defined as full-time work for the government or a tax-exempt or-
ganization) would see forgiveness after 10 years under the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program. 9
However, it is important to note that the ultimate debt
forgiveness would count as income in the year in which it oc-
curred. Thus, if a student chose payment options that 6nly cov-
ered interest accrual (or less), there could be a sizeable tax bill
due, particularly on the 25-year plan. Moreover, given spotty
administration of the program, many are concerned that borrow-
ers will either be misled about the availability of forgiveness, or
http://www.americanbar.org/contentdam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/PSLF2014r
es.authcheckdam.pdf, page 3. The 1993 legislation "required the Secretary of
Education to offer borrowers an income contingent repayment plan through
which students would pay 20% of their income each year toward their federal
student loan repayment, and the Secretary would cancel any remaining bal-
ance at the end of a period of repayment not to exceed 25 years." Id.
16 Philip G. Schrag, The Federal Income-Contingent Repayment Option
for Law Student Loans, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 830-31 (2001)
("[P]olicymakers originally anticipated ICR would be used by 15-30% of bor-
rowers. The Secretary of Education projected that between 1996-2000, 17% of
all direct loans.., would be repaid under the income- contingent repayment
option. In fact, [as of 2000] fewer than 1% of new borrowers at schools that of-
fer federal direct loans [chose] income-contingent repayment.").
17 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2012).
Is Id.
'9 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B)(i).
Vol. 28:1
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that government contractors will impose documentation hurdles
on those attempting to avail themselves of IBR.2 0
Congress amended IBR in 2010 to shorten the repayment
period to 20 years and reduce the repayment obligation to 10% of
discretionary income for those who borrowed in 2014 or later. 21 In
2012, the Obama Administration deployed funds to permit those
who had borrowed in 2007 or later and entered repayment in
2012 or later to enroll in this more generous version of IBR. Giv-
en extraordinary government profits from student loans in re-
payment (the government's costs of borrowing have been far
lower than the interest earned from student debt), this was a fair
change in policy. In 2014, President Obama called on the DOE to
develop a program to assist pre-2007 borrowers on terms similar
to those of extant IBR.2 2 DOE released a plan to do so in a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) of July 9, 2015, deeming the
proposed program the Revised Pay as You Earn plan
(REPAYE).3
Unfortunately, the DOE has proposed several conditions
on entry into REPAYE of dubious merit either as a matter of pol-
icy or as a reflection of the President's wishes. For example, DOE
has chosen to include the borrower's spouse's income in calcula-
20 Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, How the attempt to fix student loans got
bogged down by the middlemen, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-the-education-
department-turned-into-a-massive-bank/2015/08/23/7618f2 fa- 1442-1 le5-9ddc-
e3353542100c_story.html ("There are also questions about whether servicers,
to maximize their profits, are misleading people about their repayment options.
Advocacy groups say rather than helping struggling borrowers enroll in in-
come-driven plans - a time- and resource-heavy effort - servicers opt for an
easier, short-term solution such as deferring the payments."); DEANNE LOONrN
AND PERSIS WU, POUNDING STUDENT BORROWERS: THE HEAVY COSTS OF
THE GOVERNMENT'S PARTNERSHIP WITH DEBT COLLECTION AGENCIES, 16-
17 (2014), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-sl-
debt-collectors.pdf.
21 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e).
22 Memorandum, supra note 11.
23 Student Assistance General Provisions, supra note 12 ("On June 9 2014,
the President issued a memorandum (79 FR 33843) directing the Secretary to
propose regulations by June 9, 2015, that will allow additional students who
borrowed Federal Direct Loans to cap their Federal student loan payments at
10 percent of their income.").
2015
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tions of the 10% repayment figure.24 As education finance law ex-
pert Philip Schrag has observed, this decision expressly contra-
dicts the intent expressed by Congress in extant legislation on the
issue.2 5 DOE has made the time-to-forgiveness twenty-five (25)
years for those with any graduate school debt, even though it
could have made it less. 26 DOE has also included a number of
confusing provisions about eligibility for non-accrual of interest
once a borrower is enrolled in REPAYE." One expert commenter
opined that it may be impossible for many borrowers to accurate-
ly understand their rights and obligations under the program.2"
Other commenters also criticized REPAVE for being un-
duly complex and punitive. They made the case for shortening
the repayment period needed to earn forgiveness of debt, and sof-
tening or elimination of the marriage penalty in the proposed
rules.29 Unfortunately, the DOE may not fully understand the
24 Id. at 39609.
25 Philip Schrag, Comment on Student Assistance General Provisions,
Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Di-
rect Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 39608 (proposed July 9, 2015) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pts 668, 662, & 685),
ht-tp://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D = ED-2014-OPE-0161-1266
("The statutory authority for ICR did not give the Department the authority to
impose a marriage penalty on borrowers who file separate tax returns. It pro-
vides that '[a] repayment schedule ... shall be based on the adjusted gross in-
come ... of the borrower or, if the borrower is married andfiles a Federal in-
come tax return jointly with the borrower's spouse, on the adjusted gross
income of the borrower and the borrower's spouse.' 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(e)(2)
(emphasis added). Thus, the Department is authorized only to base the repay-
ment obligation on the AGI of the borrower, unless the borrower files a joint
return.").
26 Student Assistance General Provisions, supra note 12. ("a borrower
would qualify for forgiveness after 25 years if the loans being repaid under the
REPAYE plan include a loan the borrower received to pay for graduate or
professional study or a consolidation loan that repaid a loan received to pay for
graduate or professional study.").
27 John R. Brooks, Comment on Student Assistance General Provisions,
Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Di-
rect Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 39608 (Proposed July 9, 2015) (to be codified
at 34 C.F.R. pts 668, 662, & 685),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=ED-2014-OPE-0161-2886.
28 Id. ("The complex way in which interest is forgiven will make it largely
impossible for borrowers to estimate what their costs of repayment will be.").
29 Senators have also weighed in to this effect. See Senators to Dept. of
Education: Proposed Changes to Student Loan Program could Harm Borrow-
ers, Sheldon Whitehouse: U.S. Senator for R.I. (June 16, 2015),
Vol. 28:1
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value of higher education (see Part A) and the cost of federal cred-
it programs (see Part B). Taking the true benefits and costs into
account, the DOE would be well-advised to make the terms of
REPAYE more accommodating and simpler (see Part C).
A. The DOE Understates the Value of Higher Education
The DOE should not understate the value of higher edu-
cation. There is extensive work based on empirical data that in-
dependently documents the value of higher education.30 There is
also sophisticated work synthesizing the literature of labor econ-
omists on the earnings premium conferred by higher education
(and controlling for selection effects).31 The DOE should give a
more fine-grained accounting of these benefits before imposing
burdensome and complex limitations on the availability of loan
forgiveness.
There are also unique equity and timing considerations
that recommend more generous treatment of the borrowers tar-
geted by REPAYE who borrowed before 2008. Specifically, be-
tween 2008 and 2013, student loans generated a $120 billion sur-
plus for the government.32 The education attained by these
borrowers created human capital that will pay dividends to the
government, in the form of higher taxes and reduced need for so-
cial services, for years to come. 3
Moreover, pre-2007 borrowers could not have foreseen the
global financial crisis that started in 2008 and devastated U.S.
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/senators-to-dept-of-education-
proposed-changes-to-student-loan-program-could-harm-borrowers. A proposal
currently under review by the Department would, according to the Senators,
"add unnecessary complexity, increase costs for responsible low- and middle-
income borrowers, and result in the disparate treatment of graduate and un-
dergraduate borrowers." Id.
30 See, e.g., McIntyre & Simkovic, supra note 11; Leonhardt, Is College
Worth It? Clearly, New Data Say, supra note 11; Leonhardt, Even for Cash-
iers, College Pays Off, supra note 11.
31 Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, supra note 11; Simkovic, Do Increases
in the Cost of College Pay for Themselves?, supra note 11.
32 Shahien Nasripour, Obama Student Loan Policy Reaping $51 Billion
Profit, HUFFINGTON POST: HUFF POST POLITICS (May 14, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/14/obama-student-loans-policy-
profit n 3276428.html.
33 Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, supra note 11.
2015
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employment figures. Declines in employment in many fields were
not due to a lack of initiative by such borrowers, and such bor-
rowers did not cause and could not have foreseen many of the
structural changes in the economy that hurt their earnings power.
A cyclical downturn of greater intensity and duration than any
the U.S. has experienced since the 1930s is ample reason for the
DOE to use statutory authority to benefit borrowers straightfor-
wardly, rather than creating a labyrinth of exceptions and excep-
tions to exceptions that can easily trap even the careful in subop-
timal repayment plans.
In summary, the DOE should accurately count the contri-
bution of student borrowers to workforce preparedness, overall
economic growth, and future tax revenues when considering the
proper scope and nature of debt forgiveness through REPAYE.
The education sector generates enormous value for the economy
as a whole and for most graduates, but it is a fiscal and moral im-
perative that the DOE ease the plight of borrowers who are expe-
riencing difficulty repaying. Given the rising costs of housing,
child care, and medical care, payments above 10% of discretion-
ary income could significantly compromise borrowers' financial
security. Just as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) aims to help in-
dividuals and families avoid excessive health costs, so too should
education finance policy promote financial security by better con-
straining debt repayment obligations.34
34 For ACA estimates, see Allison Hoffman, Health Care Spending and
Financial Security after the Affordable Care Act, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1481 (2014).
Health care regulation has long been characterized by the kind of complex in-
teractions between providers, private and public financers, and "consumers,"
which now complicate the financing of higher education. I put "consumers" in
quotes because neither students nor patients are the sole beneficiaries of in-
vestments made in their education or health. Society benefits as well, and pub-
lic resources are needed to avoid suboptimal investment in both fields. The
federal government must do more to make up the massive reductions in state
support in higher education that have occurred over the past 30 years. See,
e.g., Frank Pasquale, Income-based Debt Forgiveness: The Least the Govern-
ment Can Do, BALKINIZATION (July 18, 2013),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/07/income-based-debt-forgiveness-least.html;
Karin Fischer & Jack Stripling, An Era of Neglect, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC. (March 3, 2014), http://chronicle.com/article/An-Era-of-
Neglect/145045/.
Vol. 28:1
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B. The DOE Overstates the Cost of Loan Forgiveness
Loan forgiveness is not a simple cost to government. Bor-
rowers who have financial difficulties may default on their loans
due to their inability to pay. In such cases, forgiveness simply
helps the borrower avoid the kind of career-wrecking credit rec-
ord that can keep defaulters from getting jobs (and paying taxes)
years after they default. Without a more robust REPAYE pro-
gram, there will probably be more defaults as bankruptcy judges
try to expand the definition of "hardship" to accommodate over-
burdened debtors and debtors seek help with debts they are una-
ble to repay.35
The costs of the program are presented in an opaque way
in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). The NPRM es-
timates the cost of REPAYE to the U.S. Treasury at $15.3 billion
from 2016 to 2025, but that figure is not adequately balanced by
an estimate of the fiscal benefits of student loan programs overall
to the Treasury and to the economy as a whole. The DOE should
also take into account the work of Gregory Crespi, who projects a
very low number of law graduates who are eligible for REPAYE
and will enter into the program given the unfavorable terms for it
drafted in the NPRM.36 Given the similar situation of many oth.-.
ers in professional programs, estimates of the cost of these pro-
grams ought to be lowered.
C. Recommendations
Unfortunately, the NPRM draft on REPAYE does not re-
flect President Obama's call for a streamlined route to improved
IBR options for the borrowers it is supposed to serve. One key
shortcoming is the administrative complexity of the proposal.
Longstanding executive branch policy has called for reducing pa-
perwork and diminishing the already great cognitive burdens on
beneficiaries of government programs." REPAYE's complex
rules on many issues, including determination of which payments
count upon entry or exit of an IBR program, or upon consolida-
s Bernard, supra note 14; Juliano, supra note 14.
36 Gregory S. Crespi, The Obama Administration's New 'REPAYE' Plan
for Student Loan Borrowers: Not Much Help for Law School Graduates (2015),
http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract-id=2629645.
31 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013).
2015
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tion, will likely deter participation. Rules regarding capitalization
of interest also must be clarified, and the government should, in
general, avoid creating situations where compounding interest
can leave a debtor liable for paying more than twice the amount
he or she borrowed. There are already reports of servicers dis-
couraging eligible borrowers from participating in Pay As You
Earn (PAYE) because of its complexity (and ostensibly because
they fear that Congress will change the rules). Such worries lead
to unnecessary defaults. REPAYE will risk the same fate if its
complexity renders it difficult to explain in a straightforward
way.
The marriage penalty embedded in the proposed rule is al-
so unnecessarily harsh. Other commentators, such as Professor
Phil Schrag, have amply explained the infirmities of the approach
laid out in the NPRM. An unintended consequence of the NPRM
draft will be strategic delays in marriage or divorces. The DOE
should consider potential costs to the Treasury and disruptions to
family life, attributable to the strategic decisions it could encour-
age due to the marriage penalty now embedded in the NPRM.
II. DEFENDING INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT IN THE
HIGHER EDUCATION ACT REAUTHORIZATION
At present, students taking out federal loans to pay for
higher education enjoy certain protections, including the income-
contingent repayment options discussed above.3" Private lenders
do not offer such income-contingent repayment plans.39 Federal
loans also help level the playing field in other ways.4" Private
lenders can perform credit checks that, for those with low credit
scores, can just as easily reflect misfortune or a bad economy as
genuine credit risk.41 These credit checks can exclude those par-
38 John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing
of Higher Education, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2513359; see also Philip G.
Schrag, Failing Law Schools-Tamanaha's Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 387, 389 (2013).
31 Federal versus Private Loans, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/federal-vs-private (last visited August
1, 2015).
40 Id.
41 For more details on biased and arbitrary credit checks and credit scor-
ing, see FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY 23 (2015) (describing
Vol. 28:1
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ticularly in need of help.
While federal loans are available to all at the same interest
rates, private lenders often aim to charge subprime borrowers
more than prime borrowers .4 Alternatively, they may charge bor-
rowers from wealthy families (or attending wealthy institutions)
less-a form of "cherrypicking" (choosing the best risks) familiar
to the pre-PPACA health insurance industry. Moreover, federal
loans rarely require co-signers; private loans may.43 While federal
loans offer options "to delay or temporarily forgo payments (like
deferment and forbearance)," "discharge upon a borrower's
death," and "discharge upon permanent disability (with certain
limitations)," private loans may not offer any of these options.44
This divergence has led to predictable horror stories for borrow-
ers who chose private loans.45
In short, private loans impose a number of disadvantages
on borrowers.46 Yet as the Higher Education Act comes up for
reauthorization, many commentators are now calling for the fed-
eral government to act more like a private lender by raising stu-
dent loan interest rates and cutting back on protections for bor-
rowers. This advocacy is part of a larger debate about federal
scores as "opaque, arbitrary, and discriminatory").
42 Federal versus Private Loans, supra note 39.
43 Id.
44 What are the main differences between federal student loans and private
student loans?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/545/what-are-main-differences-
between-federal-student-loans-and-private-student-loans.html (last visited
August 1, 2015).
45 See Mary Pilon, When Student Loans Live On After Death, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 7, 2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 1000142405274870474190457540951052978386
0.
46 John R. Brooks and Jonathan D. Glater, Opinion, Raise the Cap on
Federal Student Loans, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0803-brooks-glater-bigger-
student-loans-20150803-story.html ("Private student loans are usually much
more costly for students; a government report from 2012 found interest rates in
excess of 16%, and nothing has improved since then. By contrast, the rate on
the most widely used federal student loan currently is 4.29%. Private loans ac-
counted for a quarter of all student lending in 2007-08 before falling sharply in
the wake of the financial crisis. But because federal loan caps have not budged
even as tuition has increased, private lending is rising again, and made up
about 9% of new debt in 2013-14.").
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credit programs.4 ' For example, some argue that there is no mar-
ket failure here and that private lenders could take the govern-
ment's place.48 Observing the federal government's long run of
profits from the federal student loan program, one might apply
that approach to education credit-if one were completely una-
ware of the many ways in which federal loans protect borrowers.
For others, this very protectiveness is suspicious. They argue that
government credit programs must play by the same harsh rules as
private lenders, or else quantify any ground they give as a loss
that must be made up either by higher taxes, or reduced spending
on other programs.49
These two, contradictory positions create a pincer attack
on federal loans. One set of critics argues that government gains
from student loans simply indicate the superfluity of a federal
role. Another set insists that agencies need to act in as profit-
oriented a manner as private lenders or account for their support
in public accounting that fails to reflect the government's unique
role in credit creation. Either set of arguments can be deployed
strategically by commentators to undermine support for student
borrowers. White papers from the New America Foundation by
Jason Delisle and Alexander Holt, which are critical of current
policies for income-based repayment, are particularly troubling,
given their assumption of a logic of austerity and zero-sum alloca-
tion of education resources. °
47 Michael Grunwald, The Real Bank of America, Politico (Jan./Feb.
2015), http:/Iwww.politico.com/magazinelstoryl2015/01/federal-loans-bank-of-
america-113920.html.
48 Id. ("If the deals are low-risk layups, why is Uncle Sam involved?").
41 Jason Delisle & Jason Richwine, The Case for Fair Value Accounting, 21
Nat'l Affairs 95 (2014), available at
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-case-for-fair-value-
accounting.
'0 JASON DELISLE & ALEXANDER HOLT, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION,
SAFETY NET OR WINDFALL? EXAMINING CHANGES TO INCOME-BASED
REPAYMENT FOR FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS (2012), available at
http://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/safety-net-or-windfall/ [hereinaf-
ter SAFETY NET]; JASON DELISLE & ALEXANDER HOLT, NEW AMERICA
EDUCATION, ZERO MARGINAL COST: MEASURING SUBSIDIES FOR GRADUATE
EDUCATION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM (2014),
available at http://www.edcentral.org/wp-
content/uploads/20141091ZeroMarginalCost_140910_DelisleHolt.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ZERO MARGINAL COST]. The New America Foundation has received funds
from the Lumina Foundation, which has had close ties to private lenders.
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Evocatively designed with images of raining $100 dollar
bills and a mischievous-looking student eager to grab a "windfall"
of loan forgiveness, the reports have garnered a great deal of me-
dia attention. Unfortunately, they fail to give an accurate picture
of the benefits of IBR while exaggerating its costs. Safety Net or
Windfall only manages to paint IBR as a boon to the wealthy by
idiosyncratically defining "high incomes" to include earnings that
many would recognize as middle class-particularly in high-cost
urban areas. Zero Marginal Cost presents some questionable dis-
tributive outcomes in a series of hypothetical repayment scenari-
os, but never presents solid evidence on how likely they are to
come to pass. It would be inadvisable to alter the IBR program
now, to the detriment of students facing volatile demand for la-
bor, in order to fight phantom shortfalls that may only arise dec-
ades from today-and may never come about at all.
A. The Distributional Effects of Income Based Repayment
The Pay As You Earn (PAYE) plan and the Public Ser-
vice Loan Forgiveness Program (PSLF) are important income-
based repayment programs. Presently, those who enroll in PAYE
are only obliged to pay 10% of their discretionary income51 to-
These lenders would greatly benefit from policy proposals to reduce federal
loan forgiveness options and raise federal loan interest rates, because each
move would make their own products comparatively more attractive. See, e.g.,
Molly Hensley-Clancy & Katie J.M. Baker, How a Private Foundation with
Student Loan Ties Became a Force in Higher Education, BUZZFEED (May 22,
2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/mollyhensleyclancy/how-a-private-
foundation-with-deep-ties-to-the-student-loan#.mqKyz8vP6. Lumina not only
pays for research, but also pays for journalists to publicize the research. See
Jennifer Ruark, To Shape the National Conversation, Gates and Lumina Sup-
port Journalism, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 14, 2013),
http://chronicle.com/article/To-Shape-the-National140297/. According to its
own history, "Lumina was sensitive to the perception that the Foundation was
linked to the student loan industry" at its inception. LUMINA FOUNDATION,
FROM THE GROUND UP: AN EARLY HISTORY OF THE LUMINA FOUNDATION
22 (2007), https://www.luminafoundation.org/files/resources/from-the-ground-
up.pdf. Given that important initial board members (and the current board
chairman) had ties to private lenders, that is no surprise. Id., at 14 (Four
founding board members of Lumina were former "directors of the Sallie Mae
board of directors; all others had been members of the USA Group board.");
ALAN COLLINGE, THE STUDENT LOAN SCAM 76 (2009).
"' See Income-based Repayment, EDFINANCIAL SERV.,
http://www.edfinancial.com/IBR (last visited May 29, 2015). The site gives an
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ward loan repayment, and their loans are forgiven after twenty
years of payments. Borrowers eligible for PLSF, those who have
spent ten years in full-time public service employment while re-
paying 10% of their discretionary income,53 are entitled to for-
giveness of the remaining balance after ten years. 4
To Delisle and Holt, this "sounds like a get-rich-quick
scam. 5 5 They are particularly concerned about "high-income"
borrowers using IBR to obtain debt forgiveness-even if their
paid-down principal and interest payments more than compen-
sate the government for the cost of making the loan.56 They aim
to require any single individual with an AGI over 300% of the
federal poverty level (FPL) to pay 15%, rather than 10%, of AGI.
They would force twenty-five years of repayment onto those in
PAYE if their loans exceeded $40,000 when they entered repay-
ment. In Zero Marginal Cost, they argue that "policymakers
should consider changes to [PAYE] and PSLF that place greater
limits on the benefits and the types of jobs that qualify borrowers
for loan forgiveness. '1 51
Given the benefits of higher education documented above,
these recommendations are puzzling. Policymakers should be re-
warding higher educational attainments, not worsening their
terms of financing. Federal borrowing costs are at very low lev-
els-why impose further burdens on graduates when the gov-
ernment itself can borrow on global markets at such low rates?
explanation of the calculation: discretionary income is adjusted gross income
minus 150% of the poverty level for a family of the size of the borrower's fami-
ly. Id.
52 Health Care & Educ. Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(e) (2012)); Fed. Stu-
dent Aid, Pay as You Earn Plan, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-earn (last
visited May 28, 2015).
13 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(3)(B)(i) (2012). Public service employment is
defined to include full-time service for any level of government and for any or-
ganization exempt from taxation under § 501(a) and described in § 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code.
54 Id.
55 SAFETY NET, supra note 50, at 1.
56 Id. at l1.
57 ZERO MARGINAL COST, supra note 50, at 23.
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But the reports make sense given the priors of the authors.
Delisle has questioned the value of graduate education and assis-
tance to graduate students. "An undergraduate degree, we've all
sort of decided, is a must for earning a middle-class income," he
has stated. "A master of arts? Probably not. These are all people
who have an undergrad degree. They have all made it, in that
sense. They are a success. The question then is, 'What is the pur-
pose of the public support of the master's degree?"'5 This view-
point is a milder version of that of his New America colleague,
Kevin Carey, who would essentially end the university as we
know it.59 New America's education policy group appears to have
both a long and short game: reduce federal support for graduate
schools now, while encouraging the "creative destruction" of insti-
tutions of higher education in the long run. Unsurprisingly, the
two objectives further the commercial interests of the private
student lending interests so influential at the Lumina Founda-
tion's inception, and those of the technology firms which also
support New America.
In Zero Marginal Cost, Delisle and Holt present a variety
of scenarios in which holders of graduate degrees may be earning
an above-average income, but still enjoy some student loan debt
forgiven. For Delisle & Holt, this is problematic because loan for-
giveness creates a moral hazard problem-why should students
borrow responsibly, they ask, if they are certain that the amounts
borrowed will be forgiven? But this view underestimates the
problems of current income -based repayment programs, includ-
ing worries about their effect on credit scores and the tax conse-
quences of forgiveness of long-accruing interest. They claim that
their work is based on a "more comprehensive and long-term per-
spective of how IBR affects different types of borrowers, particu-
larly as borrowers' incomes change over their repayment terms.""0
However, its "long-term" projections regarding the costs of these
programs are premised on an inadequate evidence base. Worries
58 Vimal Patel, Grad-School Debt is Said to Rise Rapidly and Deserve
More Policy Attention, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://chronicle.com/article/Grad-School-Debt-Is-Said-to/145539J.
11 See Audrey Watters & Sara Goldrick-Rab, Techno Fantasies, INSIDE
HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 26, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2015/03/26/essay-challenging-kevin-
careys-new-book-higher-education.
60 SAFETY NET, supra note 50, at 3.
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over "irresponsible" borrowers are also more properly targeted at
for-profit programs' abuse of credit programs, rather than stu-
dent loans as a whole.61
B. Accurately Accounting for Education's Costs & Benefits
The New America Foundation's (NAF) promotion of
harsher terms for PAYE and PLSF is premised on the idea that
these programs will eventually prove to be an unsustainable fiscal
burden. However, PAYE and PLSF should be judged as part of a
larger student loan program. That program has proven to be a
net benefit to government finances. The government has made
tens of billions of dollars each year from students.6 1 Under estab-
lished Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) models, the govern-
ment made $120 billion from student loan programs from 2008 to
2013.63
Some have tried to downplay projected gains from the
programs by promoting an alternative accounting approach,
"fair-value accounting" (FVA). This approach derogates the fed-
eral student loan program as a fiscal burden by effectively assum-
ing (a) that the government could instead lend at the higher rates
61 Stefan Collini, Sold Out, LONDON REV. BOOKS Oct. 24, 2013, at 3-12,
available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n20/stefan-collini/sold-out.
62 Shahien Nasiripour, Student Loan Rates Boost Government Profit as
Debt Damps Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/09/student-loan-rates-debt-
economy-n 3048216.html.
63 Id.; see also Congressional Budget Office, No. 4705, Options to Change
Interest Rates and Other Terms on Student Loans (June 10, 2013),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/44318-StudentLoans.pdf ("Under
FCRA's rules, CBO estimates, savings from the program will be $184 billion
for loans made between 2013 and 2023"). The CBO later promoted a different
accounting method, but has not explained convincingly why it wants to depart
from past methodology. See Mike Konczal, Do Taxpayers Care if Student
Loans are Paid Off Too Quickly? (On Fair Value Accounting), NEXT NEW
DEAL (June 11, 2014), http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/do-taxpayers-
care-if-student-loans-are-paid-too-quickly-fair-value-accounting. Moreover,
the CBO is required by law to use FCRA standard accounting, and when it
does so, it consistently finds "negative subsidies" (i.e., profits) regarding student
loan programs. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, STUDENT LOAN
PROGRAMS - BASELINE PROJECTIONS (Mar. 2015),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44198-2015-
03-StudentLoan.pdf ("the federal government will save on average about 11
cents for each new dollar loaned in 2016").
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now prevailing at private institutions, and (b) that defaults will
rise. The first argument fails for several reasons.6 As Matt Ygle-
sias states, "costs reported in the budget are generally lower than
the costs to the most efficient private financial institutions be-
cause the government's costs of funds are in fact lower." 5 At an
even more elementary level: what would be the point of a federal
loan program if it simply copied the terms and rates of private
lenders? Rate-setting for federal student loans also needs to
acknowledge the harshness of the present bankruptcy regime:
students already facing presumptive nondischargeability should
not be further burdened with higher interest rates.
It is hard to overstate how radical a change FVA would
present to current, accepted standards. For the years 2015 - 2024,
"The Department of Education's four largest student loan pro-
grams would yield budgetary savings of roughly $135 billion un-
der [long-established] FCRA accounting but cost roughly $88 bil-
lion on a fair-value basis. 6 6 Of course, those committed to an
ideological vision of shrinking government would rejoice at this
potential sea change in accounting.6 7 Meanwhile, the Center on
64 David Kamin, Risky Returns: Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budg-
et, 88 IND. L.J. 724, 771 (2013) (calling approaches like FVA "much more mis-
leading than.., enlightening").
6 Matt Yglesias, Fair Value Accounting Overestimates Lending Costs,
SLATE (Apr. 10, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2012/04/10/fairvalueaccounting-over
estimateslending-costs.html.
66 U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FAIR-VALUE ESTIMATES OF THE COST
OF SELECTED FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR 2015 TO 2024 (2014),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-
2014/reports/45383-FairValue.pdf. Even when constrained by FCRA, the
CBO has overestimated the cost of health care programs repeatedly. Frank
Pasquale, Politicized Prognostication at CBO, BALKINIZATION (July 28, 2009),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/07/politicized-prognostication-at-cbo.html
(quoting Bruce Vladeck, former administrator of the Health Care Financing
Administration) ("'The CBO's track record in predicting the effects of health
legislation is abysmal. Over the last two decades, the CBO has routinely over-
estimated the costs of expanded government health care benefits and underes-
timated the savings from program changes designed to reduce expenditures."').
67 PAUL RYAN, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE PATH
TO PROSPERITY: RESTORING AMERICA'S PROMISE 43-44 (2013),
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pathtoprosperity2013.pdf ("Accounting
for market risk in scoring these programs [student loans] would simultaneously
reflect their true cost to taxpayers and make risky expansions of these pro-
grams less likely to occur."). Note that many who share this position also favor
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Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) has soberly documented the
fundamental misunderstandings about the nature of government
spending it encompasses. °" In 2012, Center for American Progress
(CAP) criticized fair value as "an accounting trick" designed "to
make credit programs appear more expensive than they truly
are. "69 CAP argued that FCRA budgeting already accounts for
"credit risk," and that accounting for "market risk"-"the rate a
risk-averse private investor would charge for the perceived vari-
ability in [FCRA] estimates"-is not only unnecessary, it produc-
es inaccurate budget estimates, adds "phantom" costs that never
materialize, and harms credit programs.7"
Concern about future defaults raises an issue that is con-
centrated in for-profit schools: 46% of 2012 defaulters (on loans
that entered repayment in 2010) "attended for-profit colleges,.
which enrolled just 13% of students nationally."71 Limitations of
funds for students at schools with high default rates would be far
more targeted an approach than across-the-board limits.72 Indeed,
with the implementation of Gainful Employment rules targeting
for-profit colleges, the DOE has already begun to address the is-
sue.73 Moreover, as data emerges about borrower profiles, it ap-
pears that defaults are most common among those with the
"dynamic scoring" of tax cuts, which presume economic effects from tax cuts
long ago dismissed by Republican George H.W. Bush as "voodoo economics."
68 RICHARD KOGAN, PAUL VAN DE WATER, & JAMES HORNEY, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, HOUSE BILL WOULD ARTIFICIALLY
INFLATE COST OF FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS (June 18, 2013),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-23-12bud4.pdf
69 John Griffith, An Unfair Value for Taxpayers: "Fair- Value" Budgeting
is a Dangerous Game to Play with Federal Loans and Guarantees, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS 1 (Feb. 9, 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2012/02/pdf/fair.value.pdf.
10 Id. at 1-2.
71 New Data Confirm Troubling Student Loan Default Problems: For-
Profit Colleges Still Have Highest Rate, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS
(Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.ticas.org/files/pub/CDR_2013_NR.pdf.
12 It should also be sensitive to documented default rates. Graduate
schools in general have lower rates of default than undergraduate institutions,
a fact not acknowledged adequately in Zero Marginal Cost. See generally
ZERO MARGINAL COST, supra note 50.
71 Fact Sheet: Obama Administration Increases Accountability for Low-
Performing For-Profit Institutions, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC. (July 1, 2015),
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-obama-administration-
increases-accountability-low-performing-profit-institutions (last visited July 1,
2015).
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smallest debts-again, undermining the popular narrative that
graduate students with large loan balances are fiscal threats.14
Any estimate of future defaults in the student loan context
should adequately acknowledge how harshly bankruptcy law
treats such debts with a presumption of nondischargeability.
Moreover, estimates should not be based on extant private loan
markets, because that is where the worst credit risks now are like-
ly to be concentrated. There is a potential ratchet effect here, too.
If private lenders continually lend at a rate a few percentage
points above the public rate, and FVA requires public lenders to
lend at the private rate, then future adjustments to government
rates to reflect private rates at one point in time may simply em-
power private lenders to charge more at a later point in time.
This is a particular danger if the private student loan market
again becomes as concentrated as it was in the mid-2000s. 75
Whatever one believes about FVA, and the changes to
PAYE and PLSF that the programs' critics would make based on
it, the ultimate impact of the critics' proposals is clear: financing
an education will become more expensive. That would either re-
duce the quantity or price of education (to the extent it is depend-
ent on loan programs), or reduce the discretionary income of stu-
dents and graduates, or, most likely, have some combination of
these effects. Each possibility is likely to have negative effects.
Decades of empirical research in labor economics establish
that higher education not only correlates with improved labor
market outcomes: it causes them. Investments in higher education
also contribute to faster innovation and more rapid economic
" Susan Dynarski, Why Students With Smallest Debts Have the Larger
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/upshot/why-students-with-smallest-debts-
need-the-greatest-help.html ("It's natural for people listening to the politicians
to connect the two facts with a causal arrow: More debt leads to more default.
But the reality is surprising: Borrowers who owe the most are least likely to
default.").
15 DEANNE LOONIN, THE SALLIE MAE SAGA: A GOVERNMENT-
CREATED, STUDENT DEBT FUELED PROFIT MACHINE (2014); ALAN
COLLINGE, THE STUDENT LOAN SCAM 13 (2009) ("By 2006, Sallie Mae virtu-
ally dominated the student loan industry. It was about four times larger than
its nearest competitor (Citibank), manag[ing] $123 billion in student loans.").
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growth.76 Delisle and Holt warn about IBR subsidizing "high-cost
graduate and professional schools."77 But costs and quality are
correlated: aside from those in the for-profit sector, more expen-
sive programs devote more resources to instruction and therefore
produce better student outcomes. Student loan default rates are
typically lower for more expensive and higher quality programs,
while default rates are higher for less expensive and lower quality
programs and those with lower completion rates.78
Higher education provides public benefits in the form of
increased income and payroll tax revenues and lower burdens on
publicly-funded social services. The tax revenue benefits alone-
approximately forty percent of every extra dollar an individual
earns because of increased educational attainment-are typically
more than enough to fully cover the costs of higher education.7 9
Most individuals who defer payment of their loans in early years
while their incomes are low will eventually repay their loans in
full and with interest. Educated workers' earnings grow rapidly
as they gain experience and typically peak decades after they
have completed their degrees. Even partial repayment of a loan
can still produce a profit for lender because the partial payments
are often more than sufficient to cover financing and administra-
tive costs.
Critics of IBR say that life-cycle equities counsel against
forgiving loans at ten or twenty years into repayment because a
borrower may be entering a highly paid phase of their career. But
to correct for that fairly, they should also be advocating for reduc-
ing how much borrowers must pay at earlier, lower-paid phases
of their career. Life-cycle equity cannot be a one-way ratchet to-
ward squeezing borrowers, or else the concept loses all meaning.
76 See generally Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 527 (2013).
77 SAFETY NET, supra note 50, at 13.
78 Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, supra note 76; Simkovic & McIn-
tyre, supra note 11. Consider as well recent evidence on for-profit law schools.
Patricia Cohen, For-Profit Colleges Accused of Fraud Still Receive U.S.
Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/business/for-profit-colleges-accused-of-
fraud-still-receive-us-funds.html? r=1 ("Kaplan's schools, including its online
California law school, where only one in five students graduates, received
$7 76.3 million worth of federal student loans and grants last year.").
79 Simkovic & McIntyre, supra note 11, at 283.
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C. Fiscal Analysis of Loans should not be Partial
Program performance should be evaluated with respect to
the percent of loans originated, not the percent currently out-
standing. Many successful graduates repay their loans and shrink
their balances, while those who are less successful defer payment
and grow their balances.8 0 Measuring performance of the percent
of loans outstanding introduces survivorship bias.1
If federal student loans were abolished in favor of private
provision of credit, students would be forced to pay more for an
education of lower quality.82 Furthermore, more education spend-
ing would go to interest payments and less would go to instruc-
tion and support services that benefit students.83 Additionally,
fewer students would complete their degrees, unemployment
would be higher, economic growth would be slower, and the fed-
eral budget would be on a shakier footing than it is today. 4
80 See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS
FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 80-83 (2009), available at
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/publications/sterling/AJD2 .pdf.
81 See generally Tyler Shumway, Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurate-
ly: A Simple Hazard Model, 74 J. Bus. 101 (2001).
82 Jonathan D. Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow
College Students to Borrow More Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 11, 34 (2011) ("If graduates' loans came through federal
loan programs, then all debts would be eligible for repayment assistance pro-
grams supporting careers in the public interest."). Glater has also critiqued the
variable pricing of loans that would likely be accelerated by further privatiza-
tion of educational credit programs. Jonathan D. Glater, The Unsupportable
Cost of Variable Pricing of Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2137
(2013).
83 Reallocating funds from higher education institutions to the higher in-
terest payments demanded by private lenders would be doubly self-defeating:
it would deter students from enrolling, and reduce funds available for instruc-
tion. For more on the negative fiscal impacts of the latter point, see Stacy Berg
Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective
College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117
Q.J. ECON. 1491, 1524 (2002) ("We do find that students who attend colleges
with higher average tuition costs tend to earn higher income years later, after
adjusting for student characteristics .... [T]uition matters because higher cost
schools devote more resources to student instruction."). Reduced incomes mean
reduced future tax-paying potential.
84 Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71,
S71 (1990) ("[T]he stock of human capital determines the rate of growth [and]
too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium."); Philippe Aghi-
on & Peter Howitt, A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction, 60
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As technology changes the job market, graduate education
is needed more than ever. Yet the risks inherent in training are
also high. For example, while open pharmacist positions were
once plentiful, now pharmacists in most states "are seeing either a
surplus of candidates, or a rough balance of supply and de-
mand."85 It may take a few years for a new equilibrium to be
reached, as older pharmacists retire, or newer ones take on roles
in accountable care organizations, patient-centered medical
homes, integrated community health management teams, or other
innovative forms of health delivery and administration. IBR is
designed to assure that students who take on the risk of investing
in their human capital are not beset by onerous repayment obli-
gations if, through no fault of their own, structural changes in the
economy or cyclical downturns adversely affect their employabil-
ity. 6 And, for those individuals who do not attain above-average
incomes, it offers a fair deal: the debt burden eventually ends for
those for whom education has not been a winning financial prop-
osition. The alternative, of perpetual obligations, is deeply unfair,
given norms enabling bankruptcy and "fresh starts" for nearly all
other forms of debt.
Against such reasonable present accommodations of risk
in an era of precarity, Delisle and Holt's Zero Marginal Cost pre-
sents scare scenarios stretched decades into the future. Even a
professional labor economist would probably blanch at predicting
the likely income patterns of professionals, let alone their repay-
ment strategies, decades hence. By and large, graduates from
non-profit graduate schools entering repayment tend to hear ad-
vice like Heather Jarvis recently offered to recent law school
graduates on the American Bar Association website:
ECONOMETRICA 323, 324 (1992); Richard Blundell et al., Human Capital In-
vestment: The Returns from Education and Training to the Individual, the
Firm and the Economy, 20 FISCAL STUD. 1, 16-19 (1999); Alan B. Krueger &
Mikael Lindahl, Education for Growth: Why and For Whom?, 39 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1101, 1102, 1108, 1130 (2001).
"I Katie Zadavski, The Pharmacy School Bubble is About to Burst, NEW
REPUBLIC (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/1 19634/pharmacy-school-crisis-why-
good-jobs-are-drying.
86 ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER: RISK IN THE 2 1ST
CENTURY (2003) (proposing insurance designed to protect educated individu-
als from an economy-wide decline in their area of expertise, so as to encourage
and facilitate greater investment in specialized areas of knowledge).
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[There are] federal student loan repayment plans that
include low monthly payments based on income. But
understand that the longer it takes you to repay your
loans, the more you will pay over time. If you can estab-
lish an aggressive repayment strategy, you can signifi-
cantly lower the cost of your loans over time. 7
Finally, even if a much higher than expected percentage of grad-
uate students take advantage of IBR, there is plenty of time to
deal with that putative crisis when it arises, rather than preemp-
tively imposing austerity on recent graduates facing a volatile job
market.
Some claim that loan forgiveness just leads to tuition infla-
tion, but it is difficult to verify that claim.8 The "sticker price" of
many schools is indeed high-but close examination of net tuition
paid over the past twenty years tells a more nuanced story. After
adjusting for inflation, David Leonhardt reports, net tuition and
fees at private four-year colleges rose 22% from 1992-2014, and
60% at public four-year colleges.8 9 Gas prices rose 83% in that pe-
riod, and child care, 44%. 90 In graduate schools, the data is not as
robust, but "price wars" in legal education have been going on for
years. While it is intuitively plausible that increases in federal
support for education cause increases in tuition (a proposition
known as the "Bennett Hypothesis," for former Secretary of Edu-
cation William Bennett),91 actual evidence is mixed. As Michael
87 Heather Jarvis, Heads Up ILs: How to Finance Your Legal Education
the Smart Way, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 2014, at 18.
88 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Impact of Loan Limit Increases on
College Prices is Difficult to Discern, GAO-14-7, at 2 (2014), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets1670/660991.pdf ("GAO's analysis found that the
economic effects of recession, which affected families' employment income,
and net worth make it difficult to isolate the impact the recession had on stu-
dents' decisions to borrow money to finance college expenses versus the impact
of the loan limit increases.").
89 David Leonhardt, How the Government Exaggerates the Cost of Col-
lege, N.Y. Times (July 29, 2014),
http:/Iwww.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/upshot/how-the-government-exaggerates-
the-cost-of-college.html.
90 Id.
')' For more on the Bennett Hypothesis, see Samantha Stainburn, Cath-
ching Up on the Bennett Hypothesis, N.Y. Times (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/education/edlife/catching-up-on-the-
bennett-hypothesis.html.
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Simkovic has observed, "there is little evidence in the peer-
reviewed literature that increases in the availability of public stu-
dent loans drive up tuition net of scholarships and grants at non-
profit and public institutions of higher education."92 Simkovic ob-
serves that "there is some evidence" that the Bennett Hypothesis
holds for for-profit trade schools, but this is a problem better tar-
geted by rules governing those schools, not ones undermining fi-
nancing opportunities generally (or pushing students out of gov-
ernment lending programs and into more risky private ones).93
Delisle and Holt fail to give a credible estimate of the
overall negative fiscal impact of even their own very high esti-
mates of future participation in loan forgiveness programs. And if
they had to estimate all the positive impacts professional schools
have on our economy-such as leading "meds & eds" redevelop-
ment of inner cities, research on cutting edge medicine, and care
and advocacy for the most marginal members of our society, to
name a few-they would find that the government, if anything,
massively underfunds the education sector. Education is a public
good, and plans to increase the cost of its financing are likely to
reduce growth and productivity.
D. Cutting PA YE and PLSF is an Unwise Policy
Delisle & Holt's recommendations for IBR promise little,
if any, savings to the federal government once a full accounting of
the benefits of education is made. Squeezing the often precarious
finances of young graduates will not contribute to economic
growth or fiscal stability. Delisle's work is not limited to student
loans; he has also advocated for "fair value accounting" as a gen-
eral principle of budgeting. 4 As the CBPP has observed, this ap-
proach would artificially inflate the cost of a wide array of federal
credit programs-thereby either reducing their availability, or
raising their costs to beneficiaries. This campaign against feder-
92 Michael Simkovic, Public Versus Private Student Loans, Brian Leiter's
Law School Reports, (Aug. 3, 2014),
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2015/08/public-versus-private-
student-loans-michael-simkovic.htmL
93 Id.
94 Delisle & Richwine, supra note 48.
95 Paul N. Van de Water, "Fair-Value" Approach Would Make Student
Loan Accounting Less Accurate, Not More, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y
PRIORITIES: OFF THE CHARTS BLOG (Apr. 25, 2014),
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al credit programs would impose a double bind on virtually any
federal loan: if it makes too much money for the government, it is
characterized as something the market should do, while if it loses
money, it's shamed as a Solyndra-style subsidy.9 6
Many students who might be afraid to enroll without IBR
will not actually end up needing IBR. Even if they do, many will
probably still pay enough in interest and taxes that the govern-
ment comes out ahead. This is why insurance is, overall, a profit-
able business-individuals are overly risk averse. Providing con-
tingent, targeted social insurance to students via PAYE and
PLSF is a small price to pay for increasing the United States'
economic competitiveness, and it may not be a price at all. The
question is: in aggregate, does IBR increase tax revenue and stu-
dent loan revenue by more than its cost? This depends on how it
affects behavior of would-be students. Given the high rate of re-
turn on education and high marginal tax rates on educated labor,
it doesn't take much of a boost to enrollments and educational at-
tainment for IBR to generate a profit for the federal government.
By raising alarms about the possibility of borrowers, dec-
ades hence, filing en masse for debt forgiveness, NAF is building
a case for cutting back on loan forgiveness. If it succeeds, stu-
dents are likely to rely more heavily on private loans. This could
be a disaster for borrowers, because private lenders often have no
legal obligation to adjust their terms if borrowers become ill or
lose their jobs, whereas government loans include provisions for
income-based repayment and waivers for certain disabilities.
Cuts to IBR would also burden the U.S. economy with a less-
http://www.offthechartsblog.org/fair-value-approach-would-make-student-
loan-accounting-less-accurate-not-more/; Richard Kogan, Altering Accounting
for Federal Credit Programs Would Artificially Inflate Costs, Raise Risk of
Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/altering-accounting-for-federal-credit-
programs-would-artificially-inflate-costs-raise-risk; Richard Kogan et al.,
House Bill Would Artificially Inflate Cost of Federal Credit Programs, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (June 18, 2013),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/house-bill-would-artificially-inflate-cost-of-
federal-credit-programs.
96 For an example of this double bind reasoning, see Grunwald, supra note
46; for a response, see MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL
STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 129-32 (2013) (on
Solyndra).
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educated labor force, less able to pay the taxes needed to improve
the country's fiscal outlook. It would be unwise to radically
change PAYE and PSLF on the basis of speculative projections.
III.CONCLUSION: BRINGING THE MACROECONOMIC
IMPACT OF HIGHER EDUCATION BACK IN
Policymakers should be wary of the dominant critiques of
the federal role in lending, especially given troubling alternatives
like increased private loan provision. A common talking point is
that government is spending too much on its credit programs, but
there is no documented unfair subsidy of student loans. There is
some dispute-proponents of traditional accounting show a gov-
ernment profit from the loans, while the "fair value accounting"
(FVA) approach shows a loss." But FVA is based on a category
mistake about the government's cost of lending, and ignores the
documented reduction in costs via government lending.9" Moreo-
ver, until the law of government accounting is changed, it makes
little sense to cite the idiosyncratic, biased, and ideologically driv-
en FVA analysis. It serves to corrode the terms of credit available
to students while doing nothing to advance its purported fiscal
aims.
Without competition from federal loans, private lenders
will fill the vacuum, offering shoddier terms to most borrowers
(such as no IBR, higher interest rates, and harsher repayment
terms).99 Some claim that higher rates on loans will lead students
to demand lower tuition, end up with a lower principal balance,
97 Shahien Nasiripour, Student Loan Borrowers' Costs to Jump as Educa-
tion Department Reaps Huge Profit, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/student-loan-profits/.
98 See Mike Konczal, Finance 101 Problems in National Affairs' Case for
Fair-Value Accounting, NEXT NEW DEAL (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/finance- 101-problems-national-
affairs-case-fair-value-accounting (observing the fundamental difference be-
tween "public and private risks").
99 Glater, supra note 82. See also Libby Nelson, Counting on Banks to
Protect Students from Predatory Colleges is Insane, VOX (updated Apr. 3,
2014), http://www.vox.com/2015/4/3/8341647/federal-student-loans-banks-no
("Allowing bankruptcy protection for student loans is a good idea. So is trying
to ensure that students aren't borrowing to pay for worthless programs that
won't help them get ahead in life. But banks aren't going to do that - they're
just going to make sure they get their money.").
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and keep monthly payments at an equilibrium. But the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York has found that "changing the mort-
gage rate by 2 percentage points only changes willingness to pay
by about 5 percent on average" for mortgages.100 Is elasticity of
demand higher for higher education than for houses? If not, pro-
jected cost savings from interest rate increases are likely to be
minimal at best. Critics of IBR have not credibly demonstrated
that federal lending distorts the higher education market more
than it makes up for predictable market failures. Even worse, if
federal lending programs' terms become more harsh, private
lenders may further entrench inequalities by imposing ever more
"risk-based" pricing-for example, by charging higher interest
rates to students at lower ranked schools in order to subsidize
lower rates at higher ranked schools. Such pricing may end up a
self-fulfilling prophecy: students paying a higher interest rate will
have a more difficult time paying off their loans precisely because
of the higher rate.
The comparison between housing and education is in-
structive in another sense. At present, interest rates on mortgages
are much lower than interest rates on Grad PLUS loans for law
students and other graduate students. There is not much inde-
pendent good in people investing in owning their homes, as op-
posed to their investing in mutual funds, bonds, or real estate in-
vestment trusts of properties more diversified than a single
family's home.' Those working hard to invest in their human
capital to be engineers, nurses, social workers, lawyers, and other
professionals, are more clearly contributing to society. So, if we
accept a basic assumption that ease of lending terms raises the
value of the thing or service the lending is for, then rates should
be reversed: graduate loans should be less expensive than mort-
gage loans.
Many educators are concerned about the rising cost of ed-
ucation for low-income and middle class households. However,
simply "reducing costs" is a deeply troubling policy response,
100 Andreas Foster & Basit Zafar, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., The Sensi-
tivity of Housing Demand to Financing Conditions: Evidence from a Survey
(2014) (rev. 2015), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff-reports/sr702.html.
"I See generally Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the
Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (2009).
2015
Loyola Consumer Law Review
since the impact on equity and quality are far from clear. The
majority of college instruction is done by exploited adjuncts; it is
hard to imagine how their "cost" could be cut further. 112 Revenues
at educational institutions could be productively reallocated, but
there is little to no objective evidence that higher education itself
takes an unfair share of national GDP.103 Assuming standard lev-
els of economic growth, societies may rationally choose to devote
more resources to human services like education and health care,
and less to, inter alia, military and finance costs. 10 4 These macro-
economic principles should guide future policy directions in the
financing of higher education.
We are now entering a critical phase in the development of
income-based repayment. The program is not helping many of
the students it was designed to aid. At the very least, potential en-
rollees need straightforward tools to compare the value of various
repayment plans. More substantively, they need faster enrollment
and better terms offered by those plans. Almost no borrowers
should be in default on loans qualified for IBR, but arduous re-
quirements for gaining IBR protections (or incompetence or mis-
information from servicers) have left struggling debtors vulnera-
ble. Even worse, some commentators are using the existence of
IBR to justify harsh treatment of student loans in bankruptcy-
even though it is now clear that it could hit some borrowers with
a large tax penalty and unknown risks to credit scores. If educa-
tion finance reform moderates do not substantially improve the
terms and accessibility of IBR, the program will lose popularity
and credibility.
102 Jordan Weissman, Someone Calculated How Many Adjunct Professors
are on Public Assistance, and the Number is Startling, SLATE (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/04/13/adjunct-pay-a-quarter of_
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w_top.
103 Leonhardt, supra note 89.
104 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE COST DISEASE: WHY COMPUTERS GET
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